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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Valentino Alex Herrera appeals from the

district court’s

summary

dismissal of his third

petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement

Of The

The

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

district court

summarized the underlying

facts

and procedural history of Herrera’s

cases as follows:

In the underlying

[criminal]

was convicted of

case,

Cassia County CR-2006-3507, Petitioner

0n a peace ofﬁcer by a jury. After being
convicted of a persistent Violator enhancement in a new trial on that issue,
Petitioner was sentenced to a term 0f 30 years, With 10 ﬁxed.
Subsequently,
[Herrera]

battery

Petitioner ﬁled a direct appeal raising various issues, including prosecutorial

misconduct consisting of a

false statement during trial.

The Court of Appeals

afﬁrmed the conviction, review was denied on January 11, 2012, and remittitur
occurred 0n January 27, 2012. State v. Herrera, 152 Idaho 24, 266 P.3d 499 (Ct.
App. 201 1) [(hereinafter “Herrera I”)].
0n various grounds,
trial and
appellate counsel.
See Cassia County Case N0. CV-2013-1. However, these
claims were summarily dismissed by the district court, and the dismissal was
afﬁrmed on appeal. Herrera v. State, N0. 42351, [2016 WL 1177735] (Idaho Ct.
App. March 25, 2016) (unpublished) [(hereinafter “Herrera II”)].
In 2013, Petitioner timely ﬁled for post-conviction relief

including denial of the right to due process and ineffective assistance 0f

Petitioner ﬁled a successive petition for post-conviction relief while the appeal

was pending, again

alleging ineffective assistance 0f counsel and due process

amongst other claims. See Cassia County Case N0. CV-2016-23. The
dismissed the action as time barred and barred by res judicata. The
Court of Appeals afﬁrmed on August 2, 2017, remitting the case on December 8,
2017. Herrera v. State, N0. 44083, 2017
3273932 (Idaho Ct. App. Aug. 2,
The Idaho Supreme Court
2017) (unpublished) [(hereinafter “Herrera III”)].
denied a writ of mandamus [sic] 0n January 23, 2018.

Violations

district court

WL

(R., pp.664-65.)

Herrera subsequently ﬁled a Rule 35 motion t0 correct an illegal sentence, which the

district court denied.

State V. Herrera,

No. 47359, 2020

21, 2020) (unpublished) (hereinafter “Herrera IV”).

the Rule 35 motion after concluding

0n the face 0f the judgment.” Li

it

WL 4917609, at *1

(Idaho Ct. App. Aug.

The Court of Appeals afﬁrmed

the denial of

“raised signiﬁcant factual issues that could not be resolved

at *3.

In January 0f 2019, Herrera ﬁled a third petition for post-conviction relief, supported

several hundred pages 0f exhibits,

additionally

moved

commencing

for the appointment

the instant case.

0f post—conviction counsel.

(R., pp.5-510.)

(R.,

by

Herrera

pp.51 1-17.) The state

ﬁled an answer alleging, among other things, that Herrera’s petition was time barred, and that his
claims were barred by res judicata. (R., p.523.)

The
531.)

district court

issued a notice 0f intent to dismiss Herrera’s third petition. (R., pp.526-

The court began by construing

the third petition as “alleging ineffective assistance of

counsel and due process Violations by prosecutorial misconduct.”

(R., p.527.)

concluded that Herrera’s petition, like the petition he ﬁled in Herrera
statute

III,

The court

was barred by

the

of limitations:
Here, the statute 0f limitations began t0 run upon the completion of Petitioner’s

That appeal was completed January 27,
2012, [in Herrera I] when the Court of Appeals, after afﬁrming the District
Court’s decision, remitted the case after review had been denied. As Petitioner’s
direct appeal

from the underlying

present action

was not ﬁled

until

case.

2019, approximately 7 years

no

on

later, it is

time

barred.

Petitioner’s second petition has

event

has been over a year since the related proceedings for that petition were

it

completed

[in

Herrera

effect

this

time frame, but in any

III].

(R., p.528.)

The

district court

found that Herrera “has not made any argument or presented any

facts

supporting tolling in either this petition 0r his previous petition,” and that he “has not done

anything for the present case that would bypass the same bars that applied to his previous
petitions.”

statute

(Id.)

The court accordingly found

of limitations,

The

this

is

that,

II,

was not

new

evidence 0r support for his ineffective

available for his previous petitions.”

concluded that “res judicata bars reconsideration of these issues.”
district court

went on

to

“similarly barred.” (R., p.530.) That

Moreover,

“[a]11

I,

(Id.)

found that Herrera’s claims were “barred by waiver 0r res

Herrera had “not presented any

appeal, in Herrera

of the

the appeal from “Petitioner’s ﬁrst post-conviction relief petition.” (Id.)

assistance 0f counsel claim that

The

facts supporting tolling

Herrera’s “ineffective assistance 0f counsel claim” had “already been

(R., p.529.)

considered” in Herrera

any

required t0 dismiss the action.”

district court additionally

judicata.”

Beyond

Court

that “[W]ithout

and “during

ﬁnd

that Herrera’s

(Id.)

The court

(Id.)

“argument based 0n due process” was

was because Herrera already

“raised due process”

0n

his ﬁrst petition for post-conviction relief,” in Herrera

evidence” Herrera presented “for his current claim

is

direct

II.

from the original

(Id.)

trial.”

(Id.)

The court concluded by noting
barred as successive because he

purported

6“

is

that Herrera “has argued that” the third petition “is not

actually innocent.”

actual innocence gateway’

(Id.)

However, the court found

this

appears to be based 0n federal habeas law,” which was

inapplicable t0 an Idaho petition for post-conviction relief, and there “is n0 parallel rule under

Idaho law.”

(Id.)

Even assuming such a rule

existed, the court

found

it

was

meritless:

Additionally, Petitioner has not demonstrated a sufﬁcient factual basis to warrant

any consideration 0f innocence even if applicable. Petitioner explicitly states that
his claims for relief are not based 0n innocence, but 0n the procedural errors of
and denial of due process by prosecutorial
misconduct, use 0f perjured testimony, and misrepresentations. Petitioner only
presents facts related to the procedure at trial and decision of counsel in handling
ineffective assistance of counsel

his case, not evidence

showing innocence.

(Id. (internal citations

The

omitted).)

district court

accordingly held that Herrera’s “claim[s] will be dismissed in 20 days”

unless Herrera demonstrated “a material issue of fact as t0 the above issues.”

(R., p.531.)

Because the court found “no reasonable person With adequate means would retain counsel for a
petition that

would

fail,” insofar as “it

was ﬁled outside

the statute 0f limitations and only alleged

claims barred by waiver and res judicata,” the court denied Herrera’s motion for counsel.

(R.,

p.533.) After Herrera did not ﬁle a timely response to the court’s notice of intent to dismiss, the

district court

entered an order and judgment summarily dismissing Herrera’s third petition.

(R.,

pp.544-52.)

Herrera subsequently ﬁled an

exhibits

in

support.

memorandum and

(R.,

notice of intent to dismiss

the

“Amended Third

p.672.)

p.553-648.)

He

also

Petition For Post-Conviction Relief"

in the prison mail system within his deadline t0

(E R., p.658).

Petition”

The

and

ﬁled a motion for reconsideration and

afﬁdavit in support (R., pp.649-60), in Which he alleged the

had been placed

Petition”

“Amended Third

district court

was a timely ﬁled response

to

respond to the court’s

under the mailbox

rule,

notice of intent to dismiss.

(R.,

agreed

its

“Amended Third

that,

Thus, the court granted Herrera’s “Motion t0 Reconsider under I.R.C.P. 60(b),” “set[]

aside the

Judgment and Order of Dismissal entered on April

2,

2019,” and held that Herrera’s

“Amended Third

Petition for Post—Conviction Relief Will be considered as a response t0 this

Court’s prior notice 0f intent to dismiss.“ (R., p.671.)

The
facts that

district court

concluded that Herrera’s response “fail[ed] to present any arguments or

overcome the bars 0f timeliness 0r

intent t0 dismiss.”

third petition

(R., p.664.)

Herrera

still

res judicata as articulated in this Court’s notice

failed to

show

that the “approximately 7 years”-late

was not untimely, and Herrera had “not made any argument or presented any

supporting tolling” the statute of limitations. (R., p.667.)

by waiver under LC.

§ 19-4908, or res judicata (or both).

Finally, the court revisited Herrera’s claims

0f

And Herrera’s

claims were

still

facts

barred

(R., pp.667-69.)

of “actual innocence,” in

light

of Herrera’s

response:

Petitioner has argued that his petition

is

actually innocent and that he raises

new

contained

of

little

direct discussion

focuses 0n this issue.

However,

not barred as successive because he

facts.

this

is

Unlike his original petition, which

issue, Petitioner’s

Petitioner’s

argument

is

Amended

Petition

based only on his

conclusion that the Victim in the original offense did not qualify as a peace ofﬁcer

from a certain
However, this evidence has already been presented, and the issue
decided by the Court of Appeals. Post-conviction relief “is not a substitute for nor
as required under the statute of conviction. His evidence stems
certiﬁcate.

1

The court

later

not as a response to
its

was considering the “Third Amended Petition”
dismiss, but as a true amended petition. For example,

used language that suggested
its

notice of intent t0

it

ﬁnal dispositive order was entitled “Order to Dismiss

Conviction Relief,” Which stated “[t]he issue presented
raises a material issue

of fact.”

(R.,

Petition for Post-

Whether Petitioner’s Amended Petition

p.664 (emphasis added).) But Herrera never sought, and the

court never granted, the requisite leave to ﬁle an

m,

is

Amended Third

amended

petition.

LC.

§

19-4906(b); Cole V.

135 Idaho 107, 110, 15 P.3d 820, 823 (2000) (noting “in a case

Where a default is
pending and n0 response is made Within twenty days of the court’s notice of dismissal, an
applicant for post-conviction relief must obtain leave of the court before ﬁling an amended
application”). Moreover, this contradicts What the court expressly held—that the “Third

Amended

Petition”

dismiss,” not a

would be “considered

new

court’s reference to

petition.

(R.,

as a response t0 this Court’s prior notice of intent t0

p.671 (emphasis added).)

Herrera’s “amended”

The

state therefore interprets the

third petition.

naming
amended

petition as either a typographical error or as a

convention, not a legal conclusion that Herrera’s third petition had been replaced by an

does

it

affect

any remedy incident

to the proceedings in the trial court, or

appeal from the sentence or conviction.” Idaho

Code

of an

§ 19-4901.

(R., p.668.)

Because the court found “the issues presented” in the third petition had “already been
raised,

and there are n0 new

facts or

arguments presented that were not unascertainable or

unavailable during Petitioner’s previous proceedings,”

to reconsider these claims.”

(R., p.669.)

summarily dismissing Herrera’s
77.)

petition.

The

it

concluded “there

district court re-entered

(R., pp.662-70.)

is

no sufﬁcient reason

an order and judgment

Herrera timely appealed. (R., pp.674-

ISSUES
Herrera states the issues on appeal

Did

as:

the district court dismiss the third Petition Without due regard to [the] Actual

Innocence claim.

Did

Petitioner’s [Attorneys] fail to

Amendment 0f the

this case

and Violate

Petitioner[’]s 6th

Federal Constitution, by failing to investigate.

Did the [Prosecutors]
Amendment[.]
Did

be effective in

Violate Petitioner[s’] right t0

due process by

their misconduct, 14th

the Idaho Court of Appeals Violate Petitioner’s Right t0 due process under the 14th

Amendment 0f the
unambiguous

Constitution and the State 0f Idaho Constitution

by

failing t0

apply

[statutes] as written.

(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)

The

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Herrera

failed t0

show

the district court erred in summarily dismissing his untimely,

meritless third petition for post-conviction relief?

ARGUMENT
Herrera Fails

T0 Show The

District Court Erred In Dismissing

His Untimely, Meritless Third

Petition For Post-ConViction Relief

“Applications for post-conviction relief under the

Which, like a

civil plaintiff, the applicant

the evidence.”

M,

McKay V.

State,

must prove

UPCPA

initiate civil

his 0r her allegations

proceedings in

by a preponderance of

148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010) (citing Hauschulz

144 Idaho 834, 838, 172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007); I.C.R. 57(c)).

Summary

appropriate Where the petitioner’s evidence raises n0 genuine issue of material fact.

m, 144 Idaho

On

518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007).

dismissal

is

Workman V.

review 0f a summary dismissal 0f a

post-conviction petition, “this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based

0n the pleadings, depositions and admissions together With any afﬁdavits 0n ﬁle and
liberally construe the facts

and reasonable inferences

in favor

of the non—moving party.”

Will

Li. at

523, 164 P.3d at 803.

On

appeal, Herrera

shows n0 genuine issue of material

conviction relief should survive

summary

The

dismissal.

Herrera’s third petition for post-conviction relief because,

fact that his third petition for post-

district court correctly

among

other things,

it

dismissed

was

plainly

untimely. (R., p.666-67.) “The limitation period of I.C. § 19-4902 begins t0 run once the Idaho

Supreme Court 0r Court 0f Appeals

issues a remittitur,”

and a petition must be “ﬁled within a

year of a ‘proceeding following an appeal’ of the underlying action

m, 144

it

challenges.” Hauschulz V.

Idaho 834, 837, 172 P.3d 1109, 1112 (2007); LC. § 19-4902(a).

Herrera’s petition

was ﬁled “approximately 7 years”

after the remittitur issued in Herrera’s direct appeal.

p.667.) Moreover, Herrera had “not

made any argument

(R.,

or presented any facts supporting tolling

in either this petition or his previous petition.”

(R., p.667.)

Thus, the

district court correctly

concluded that Herrera’s petition was untimely.

On

appeal, Herrera fails to

deciphered, Herrera

fails t0

show any

T0

error.

the extent his opening brief can be

address the timeliness issue head 0n.

Instead, Herrera appears t0

focus 0n the merits of his underlying claims, repackaging them as “actual innocence” claims

(Which

own

fail in their

clearly asserts,

should be

much

tolled.

This

is

right, as

explained below).

(E Appellant’s brief.)

less demonstrates, that his petition

(E

was

But Herrera never

timely, or that the limitation period

id.)

not the ﬁrst time Herrera has attempted t0 bypass the statute 0f limitations by

pressing the merits of his underlying claims.

attempt, in Herrera

III,

where

it

The Idaho Court 0f Appeals

rejected his prior

concluded Herrera’s second petition was untimely:

The district court summarily dismissed Herrera’s successive petition because it
was not timely ﬁled. The district court acted properly in doing so because
Herrera’s successive petition was ﬁled outside the one-year statute of limitation,
and Herrera did not set forth a sufﬁcient reason for the late ﬁling. The remittitur
in the underlying case was issued on January 11, 2012. Herrera’s initial petition
for post-conviction relief was ﬁled on December 24, 2012. Approximately three
years later, on January 15, 2016, Herrera ﬁled his successive petition. The district
court issued a notice 0f intent to dismiss the successive petition, indicating that
the petition

was not timely ﬁled and

one-year limitation period

answer

may be

setting forth the circumstances in

Which the

equitably tolled. However, in Herrera’s lengthy

he did not provide a sufﬁcient reason for the

late

timing or even argue that the statute of limitation should be equitably tolled.

Nor

t0 the notice

of

intent,

does Herrera provide such argument on appeal. Herrera simply ignores the timing

and instead focuses on his underlying arguments. Because Herrera does not
argue the statute of limitation should be tolled 0r provide a sufﬁcient reason for
issue

the late ﬁling, the district court did not err in summarily dismissing Herrera’s

successive petition.

Herrera

III,

2017

WL 3273932 *3.

That exact same rationale applies here.
the third petition

is,

by

necessity, also untimely.

If Herrera’s

And

second petition was untimely then

because Herrera continues to

fail t0

show

that the limitation period

limitation.

It

would have been

tolled, the third petition

was barred by

the statute 0f

was properly summarily dismissed.

Beyond

that, the district court correctly

dismissed Herrera’s third petition because his

claims “0f ineffective assistance 0f counsel and due process Violations due to prosecutorial

misconduct” were “barred by waiver or res judicata.”
assistance of counsel claim”

subject to issue preclusion.

relitigated

(R., p.529.)

To

had “already been considered in” Herrera’s ﬁrst petition

(id.), it is

“Under Idaho law, issue preclusion bars an issue from being

inter alia, ‘the issue decided in the prior litigation

if,

the extent the “ineffective

was

identical t0 the issue

presented in the present action’ and ‘the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the

prior litigation.’”

Ticor Title Co.

Severson

V. Stanion,

While difﬁcult
trial

159 Idaho 517, 521, 363 P.3d 358, 362 (2015) (quoting

144 Idaho 119, 124, 157 P.3d 613, 618 (2007)).

to parse, at least

some of Herrera’s

WL

1177735 **5-9. Or,

litigated in the ﬁrst

19-4908.

Johnson

Moreover, the

to the extent Herrera’s ineffective assistance claims

round of post-conviction
V.

State,

litigation,

found Herrera failed

were not

he waived them pursuant to Idaho Code

158 Idaho 852, 856, 353 P.3d 1086, 1090

district court rightly

w

allegations of ineffective assistance of

counsel (R., p.555-56) appear to mirror issues already raised and actually decided in

ﬂ, 2016

§

V. State,

to

(Ct.

App. 2015).

show any new claims were “not

[sic]

unascertainable 0r unavailable” at the time of the ﬁrst petition, the narrow exception to the rule.

(R., pp.667—69.)

In any event, the district court correctly found these claims were “barred

waiver or res judicata.”

2

The

district court’s

dismissal.

For the same reasons, the

district court correctly

found that

ﬁnal order dismissing the third petition did not restate waiver as a basis for

(R., p.669.)

language suggests

(R., p.529.)2

by

it still

However, the court’s

repetition of the “unascertainable or unavailable”

considered waiver a basis for

10

summary dismissal.

(E

id.)

Herrera’s due process

to

waiver—were

As he
somehow

claims—Which were

either raised in Herrera

I

and/or Herrera

II,

0r subj ect

“similarly barred.” (R., p.668.)

did below, Herrera appears to argue on appeal that “actual innocence” should

provide a gateway for asserting these untimely, procedurally defaulted and/or waived
(Appellant’s brief, p.9.)

claims in the third petition.

But while Herrera

cites authority

such a gateway exists in federal habeas litigation

(ﬂ Appellant’s brief,

DLIO, 513 U.S. 298 (1995)», he

any state-court analog.

m, 148 Idaho

fails t0 identify

showing

p.11 (citing Schlup V.

E

alﬂ Rhoades

V.

247, 253, 220 P.3d 1066, 1072 (2009) (declining t0 decide “whether due process

requires a free-standing actual innocence exception to the application 0f LC. § 19-4902”).

Even assuming

a federal “actual innocence” gateway could provide a makeshift end-run

around procedural default in

state court,

Herrera shows n0 actual innocence.

remotely meet the high bar of showing actual innocence in Idaho: “that
that

no reasonable juror would have convicted” Herrera “in the

Abbott
Herrera

V. State,

fails to

No. 40249, 2013

show

WL 5316899,

at

it is

light

His claims d0 not

more

0f the

likely than not

new

evidence.”

*2 (Idaho Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2013). Indeed,

that his claims or the supporting evidence are

even new; as the court

alluded t0 below, Herrera’s “actual innocence” claims simply appear t0 be his already—rejected

merits claims.

(E Appellant’s brief, pp.9-24; R., p.530 (“Petitioner only presents facts related

t0 the procedure at trial

and decisions 0f counsel

in handling his case, not evidence

showing

innocence.”).) Likewise, Herrera’s exhibits in support of his third petition appear to be “from the

original trial” (R., 530), or,

more

from the many cases preceding

often, just copies

this

one

(ﬂ, gg,

of transcripts, pleadings, and judicial opinions

R., pp.593-602).

In short, Herrera’s “actual innocence” claims appear to simply repurpose

merits claims.

As

the district court put

it,

“this evidence has already

11

and reassert his

been presented, and the

issue decided

by

the Court 0f Appeals.” (R., p.668.) These claims

on the merits

res judicata, or fail

they would not

show

(for the reasons already

“actual innocence”

by any

stretch

that note, Herrera’s petition appears t0

relitigate his

152 Idaho

0f the doctrine.

be just the

266 P.3d

at

*2, n.1 (claiming the court’s jurisdiction

certiﬁcation

was

sentence

illegal

invalid”)

ﬂ

employment with
cannot

petition,

deﬁnition, Herrera’s

own relitigation.

latest in a series

of attempts to

is

Herrera

“was extinguished when

E1 Herrera IV,

2020

WL 4917609

it

at *1

III,

2017

trial

WL 3273932 at

was revealed

that the ofﬁcer

(“Herrera contends that his

Appellant’s brief pp.22 (arguing “Garrett, absent lawﬁJI extra time t0 certify

was

in fact not legally certiﬁed t0

the County”).

ﬁnd any

which

w

I,

because the Victim, a former sheriff’s deputy, was not a former peace

past October 2, 1989,

state

courts), but

502 (arguing “that the State did not introduce sufﬁcient

evidence to prove that Garrett was a former peace officer”)

ofﬁcer....”)

By

by

enduring central thesis—that his Victim was not a peace ofﬁcer. Compare Herrera

at 27,

is

therefore be barred

found by Idaho’s appellate

rejected merits claims cannot themselves be the “gateway” t0 their

On

would

The

be a peace ofﬁcer during the time of his

third petition breaks

no new ground. Try

as

it

might, the

timely, non-defaulted, 0r meritorious arguments Within Herrera’s third

precisely

Why the

district court rej ected

12

it.

Herrera

fails to

show

error.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court afﬁrm the

district court’s denial

of Herrera’s

third petition for post-conviction relief.

DATED this 30th day of September, 2020.

/s/

Kale D. Gans

KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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